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Abstract
We introduce a general framework for continuous-time betting markets, in which a bookmaker can
dynamically control the prices of bets on outcomes of random events. In turn, the prices set by the
bookmaker affect the rate or intensity of bets placed by gamblers. The bookmaker seeks a price process
that maximizes his expected (utility of) terminal wealth. We obtain explicit solutions or characterizations
to the bookmaker’s optimal bookmaking problem in various interesting models.
Keywords: HJB equation; optimization; Poisson process; sports betting; stochastic control; utility
1 Introduction
Sports gambling is a large and fast-growing industry. According to a recent report by Zion (2018), the
global sports betting market was valued at around 104.31 billion USD in 2017 and is estimated to reach
approximately 155.49 billion by 2024. As noted by Street and Smith (2018), growth within the United States
is expected to be particularly strong due to a May 2018 ruling by the Supreme Court, which deemed the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) unconstitutional and thereby paved the way for
states to rule individually on the legality of sports gambling. Less than a year after the PASPA ruling, eleven
states had passed bills legalizing gambling on sports compared to just one (Nevada) prior to the PASPA
ruling. At the time of the writing of this paper, several additional states have drafted bills to legalize sports
betting within their borders.
In this paper, we analyze sports betting markets from the perspective of a bookmaker. A bookmaker sets
prices for bets placed on different outcomes of sporting events, collects revenue from these bets, and pays
out winning bets. Often the outcomes are binary (team A wins or team B wins). But, some events may have
more than two outcomes (e.g., in an association football match, a team may win, lose or tie). Moreover, the
outcomes need not be mutually exclusive (e.g., separate bets could be placed on team A winning and player
X scoring). Ideally, a bookmaker strives to set prices in such a way that, no matter what the outcome of a
particular event, he collects sufficient betting revenue to pay out all winning bets while also retaining some
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revenue as profit. However, because a bookmaker only controls the prices of bets – not the number of bets
placed on different outcomes – he may lose money on a sporting event if a particular outcome occurs.
Consider, for example, a sporting event with only two mutually exclusive outcomes: A and B. Suppose
the bookmaker has received many more bets on outcome A than on outcome B. If outcome A occurs, then
the bookmaker would lose money unless the revenue he has collected from bets placed on outcome B is
sufficient to cover the payout of bets placed on outcome A. Thus, if a bookmaker finds himself in a situation
in which he has collected many more bets on outcome A than on outcome B, he may raise the price of a
bet placed on outcome A and/or lower the price of a bet placed on outcome B. This strategy would lower
the demand for bets placed on outcome A and increase the demand for bets placed on outcome B. As a
result, the bookmakers would reduce the risk that he incurs a large loss, but he would do so at the cost of
sacrificing expected profits.
Traditionally, bookmakers would only take bets prior to the start of a sporting event. In such cases,
the probabilities of particular outcomes would remain fairly static as the bookmaker received bets. More
recently, however, bookmakers have begun to take bets on sporting events as the events occur. In these
cases, the probabilities of particular outcomes evolve stochastically in time as the bookmaker takes bets.
This further complicates the task of a bookmaker who, in addition to considering the number of bets he
has collected on particular outcomes, must also consider the dynamics of the sporting event in play. For
example, scoring a point near the end of a basketball game when the score is tied would have a much larger
effect on the outcome of the game than scoring a point in the first quarter. And, the effect of scoring a goal
in the first half of an association football match would be greater than the effect of scoring a goal early in a
game of basketball.
In this paper, we provide a general framework for studying optimal bookmaking, which takes into
account the situations described above. In our framework, the probabilities of outcomes are allowed to
either be static or to evolve stochastically in time, and bets on any particular outcomes may arrive either
at a deterministic rate or at a stochastic intensity. This rate or intensity is a decreasing function of the
price the bookmaker sets and an increasing function of the probability that the outcome occurs. In this
setting a bookmaker may seek to maximize either expected wealth or expected utility from wealth. We
provide numerous examples of in-game dynamics. And we analyze specific optimization problems in which
the bookmaker’s optimal strategy can be obtained explicitly.
Existing literature on optimal bookmaking in the context of stochastic control appears to be rather
scarce. In one of the few existing papers on the topic, Hodges et al. (2013) consider the bookmaker of a
horse race. In their paper, the probability that a given horse wins the race is fixed and the number of bets
placed on a given horse is a normally distributed random variable with a mean that is proportional to the
probability that the horse will win and inversely proportional to the price set by the bookmaker. In this
one-period setting, the bookmaker seeks to set prices in order to maximize his utility from terminal wealth.
Unlike our paper, Hodges et al. (2013) do not allow the bookmaker to dynamically adjust prices as bets
come in nor do they find an analytic solution for the bookmaker’s optimal control. As far as we are aware,
our paper is the first to provide a general framework for studying optimal bookmaking in a dynamic setting.
Similar to our work, Divos et al. (2018) consider dynamic betting during an association football match.
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However, rather than approach bookmaking as an optimal control problem, they use a no-arbitrage repli-
cation argument to determine the value of a bet whose payoff is a function of the goals scored by each of
the two teams. As “hedging assets” they consider bets that pay the final goal tally of the two teams. By
contrast, in our work, the bookmaker has no underlying assets to use as hedging instruments.
In certain respects, the optimal bookmaking problem we consider is similar to the optimal market making
problem considered by Ho and Stoll (1981); Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008); Guilbaud and Pham (2013);
Guéant (2017); Adrian et al. (2019) and the optimal execution problem analyzed in Guéant et al. (2012);
Gatheral and Schied (2013); Bayraktar and Ludkovski (2014); Cartea and Jaimungal (2015); Kratz and
Schöneborn (2015). In these papers, a market maker offers limit orders to buy and sell a risky asset whose
reference price is a stochastic process. The intensity at which limit orders are filled is a decreasing function
of how far below (above) the reference price the limit order to buy (sell) is. In this setting, a market maker
seeks to maximize either his expected wealth or his expected utility from wealth, which includes both cash
generated from filled limit orders and the value of any holdings in the risky asset. In some cases, the market
maker also seeks to minimize his holdings in the risky asset. In a sense, a market maker offering limit orders
to buy and sell a risky asset is akin to a bookmaker taking bets on mutually exclusive outcomes during a
sporting event. And, a market maker seeking to minimize holdings in a risky asset is similar to a bookmaker
seeking to have equal money bet on mutually exclusive outcomes.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present a general framework for continuous-
time betting markets, state the bookmaker’s optimization problem and define his value function. In Section
3, we provide a characterization of the bookmaker’s value function as the solution of a partial (integro)-
differential equation (PDE). In Section 4, we study the bookmaker’s optimization problem in a semi-static
setting. In this section, the probabilities of outcomes remain constant in time, but bets arrive at rates
that depend on the prices set by the bookmaker. In Section 5, we study the wealth maximization problem
for a risk-neutral bookmaker. In Section 6, we focus on the bookmaker’s optimization problem when his
preferences are characterized by a utility function of exponential form. Lastly, in Section 7, we offer some
concluding remarks.
2 A General Framework for Continuous Time Betting Markets
Let us fix a probability space (Ω,F,P) and a filtration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T completed by P-null sets, where
T < ∞ is a finite time horizon. We shall suppose that all the stochastic processes and random variables
introduced in this paper are well-defined and adapted under the given filtered probability space, which may
be further characterized for specific examples or models in the sequel. We will think of P as the real world
or physical probability measure. Consider a finite number of subsets (Ai)i∈Nn (where Nn := {1, 2, · · · , n})
of Ω, each of which is FT-measurable (i.e., Ai ∈ FT for all i). We can think of Ai as a particular set of
outcomes of a sporting event, which finishes at time T. To avoid trivial cases, we suppose P(Ai) ∈ (0, 1) for
all i. Note that the sets (Ai)i∈Nn need not be a partition of Ω. In particular, there may be outcomes ω such
that ω /∈ ∪ni=1Ai. Moreover, sets may overlap (i.e., we may have Ai ∩ Aj 6= ∅ where i 6= j).
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We will denote by Pi = (Pit)0≤t≤T the Ft-conditional probability of Ai. We have
Pit = Et1Ai ,
where Et · := E( · |Ft) denotes conditional expectation. Note that, by the tower property of conditional
expectation, Pi is a (P,F)-martingale. We will denote by P = (P1, P2, · · · , Pn) the vector of conditional
probabilities. In general, the conditional probability Pi is a stochastic process. However, we will also consider
scenarios where it is reasonable to assume that Pit is a fixed constant pi for all t < T. Let us take a look at
some examples of sporting events and show how we can describe them probabilistically.
Example 2.1. Consider bets taken on sets of outcomes of a sporting event (e.g., football match, horse race,
etc.) prior to the start of the event. Suppose that information leading up to the event is constant over time.
In this case, the conditional probability that any particular set of outcomes occurs should be constant over
time. We can model this situation as follows. We fix a probability space (Ω,F,P) = ([0, 1],B([0, 1]), μ) and a
filtration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T, where μ is the Lebesgue measure and (up to μ-null sets) Ft is given by Ft = {∅,Ω}
for t < T with FT = B([0, 1]). Sets of the form Ai ∈ B([0, 1]) have constant probability for all t < T because
Pit = Et1Ai = μ(Ai) for t < T. We also have P
i
T = 1Ai .
Example 2.2. Suppose the number of goals scored by player X in an association football match is a Poisson
process with intensity μ. Consider an in-game bet on a set of outcomes of the form Ai = “player X will finish
the match with exactly i goals.” We can model the conditional probability that Ai occurs as follows. Fix
a probability space (Ω,F,P) and let F = (Ft)0≤t≤T be the augmented filtration generated by the Poisson
process Nμ = (Nμt )0≤t≤T with intensity μ. Then we have
Pit =
i∑
n=0
P(NμT – N
μ
t = i – n)1{Nμt=n} =
i∑
n=0
e–μ(T–t)[μ(T – t)]i–n
(i – n)!
1{Nμt=n}
. (2.1)
From (2.1) we can easily construct the conditional probabilities of outcomes of the form “player X will finish
the match with between i and j goals (inclusive).” For example, if Aj = “player X will score at least one
goal” then we have
Pjt = 1{Nμt≥1} + 1{Nμt=0}(1 – e
–μ(T–t)).
The dynamics of Pj can be easily deduced
dPjt = 1{Pjt–<1}
e–μ(T–t)(dNμt – μdt), P
j
0 = 1 – e
–μT. (2.2)
Observe that Pj in (2.2) is a martingale, as it must be.
Example 2.3. Consider an National Basketball Association (NBA) game. Although points in NBA games
are integer-valued, as the number of points in an NBA game is on the order of 100, it is reasonable to
approximate the number of points scored as a R-valued process. To this end, let us consider a probability
space (Ω,F,P) equipped with a filtration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T for a Brownian motion W = (Wt)0≤t≤T. We can
model the point differential X = (Xt)0≤t≤T between team A and team B as a Brownian motion with drift
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Xt = μt + σWt where the sign and size of μ captures how much team A is favored by. Now, consider a bet
on a set of outcomes of the form Ai = “team A will win by i points or more.” Then we have
Pit = P(XT ≥ i|Xt) = P(XT – Xt ≥ i – Xt) = P
(
WT – Wt ≥
i – Xt – μ(T – t)
σ
)
= 1 – Φ
( i – Xt – μ(T – t)
σ
√
T – t
)
= Φ
(Xt + μ(T – t) – i
σ
√
T – t
)
,
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of a standard normal random variable. We can easily
compute the dynamics of Pit using Itô’s Lemma. We have
dPit = Φ
′
(
Φ–1(Pit)
) 1√
T – t
dWt, Pi0 = Φ
(μT – i
σ
√
T
)
.
Observe that Pi is a martingale, as it must be.
Having seen a few examples of how we can describe sporting events probabilistically, let us now focus on
the payoff structure of bets. Throughout this paper, we will assume that a bet placed on a set of outcomes
Ai pays one unit of currency at time T if and only if ω ∈ Ai (i.e., if Ai occurs). Thus, we have
“payoff of a bet placed on Ai” = 1Ai = P
i
T. (2.3)
Remark 2.4. In the US, if a bookmaker quotes odds of +120 on outcome A, then a $120 bet on outcome A
would pay $120 + $100 = $220 if A occurs. If a bookmaker quotes odds of -110 on outcome B, then a $100
bet on outcome B would pay $100 + $110 = $210 if B occurs. The payoff in (2.3) is simply a convenient
normalization, which can be applied to any bet that pays a fixed (i.e., non-random) amount if a particular
outcome or set of outcomes occurs.
In our framework, the bookmaker cannot control the number of bets that the public places on a set of
outcomes Ai directly. However, the bookmaker can set the price of a bet placed on Ai and this will affect
the rate or intensity at which bets on Ai are placed. We will denote by ui = (uit)0≤t<T the price set by the
bookmaker of a bet placed on Ai. The vector of prices will be denoted as u = (u1, u2, · · · , un). It will be
helpful at this stage to introduce a set of admissible pricing strategies A(t, T), which we define as follows
A(t, T) := {u = (us)s∈[t,T) : u is progressively measure w.r.t. F and us ∈ A}, where A := [0, 1]n, (2.4)
with t ∈ [0, T). Note that we do not include the control uT in the definition of A(t, T), as the case at time
T is trivial. Without loss of generality, we set uiT = 1Ai for all i ∈ Nn.
Let us denote by Xu = (Xut )0≤t≤T the total revenue generated by the bookmaker and by Qu,i =
(Qu,it )0≤t≤T the total number of bets placed on a set of outcomes Ai. Note that we have indicated with a
superscript the dependencies of Xu and Qu on bookmaker’s pricing policy u. The relationship between Xu,
Qu and u is
dXut =
n∑
i=1
uit dQ
u,i
t .
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Observe that Xu and Qu,i for all i ∈ Nn are non-decreasing processes. Typically, we will have Xu0 ≡ X0 = 0
and Qu,i0 ≡ Qi0 = 0 for all i ∈ Nn. However, we do not require this (to account for the fact that the
bookmaker may have taken the bets before time 0).
In this paper, we consider two models for Qu,i. In one model, bets on a set of outcomes Ai arrive at
a rate per unit time, which is a function λi : A ×A → R¯+ of the vectors of conditional probabilities P of
outcomes and prices u set by the bookmaker. Under this model, we have
Continuous arrivals : Qu,it =
∫ t
0
λi(Ps, us)ds + Q
i
0. (2.5)
In another model, bets on a set of outcomes Ai arrive as a state-dependent Poisson process Nu,i = (N
u,i
t )0≤t≤T
whose instantaneous intensity is a function λi : A×A→ R¯+ of the vectors of conditional probabilities P of
outcomes and prices u set by the bookmaker. Under this model, we have
Poisson arrivals : Qu,it =
∫ t
0
dNu,it +Q
i
0, EtdN
u,i
t = λi(Pt, ut)dt. (2.6)
Throughout the paper, we will refer to the function λi as the rate function when bets arrive continuously
and the intensity function when bets arrive as a state-dependent Poisson process.
Remark 2.5. For sporting events with a large betting interest (e.g., the Super Bowl, the UEFA Champions
League final, etc.), the continuous arrivals model given by (2.5) is sufficient to capture the dynamics of bet
arrivals. However, for sporting events with limited betting interest (e.g., curling in the Winter Olympics,
the Westminster Dog Show, etc.), the dynamics of bet arrivals are better captured by the Poisson arrivals
model in (2.6).
Although our framework is sufficiently general to allow for the rate/intensity function λi to depend on
the entire vector of conditional probabilities P and vector of prices u, the case in which λi depends only on
the conditional probability Pi and price ui will be of special interest. In cases for which
λi(Pt, ut) ≡ λi(Pit, uit) for all i ∈ Nn and t ∈ [0, T],
we expect λi to be an increasing function of the conditional probability Pi of outcome Ai and a decreasing
function of the price ui set by the bookmaker. Examples of rate/intensity functions λi : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R¯+
that satisfy those analytical properties include
λi(pi, ui) :=
pi
1 – pi
1 – ui
ui
, (2.7)
λi(pi, ui) :=
log ui
log pi
. (2.8)
The functions (2.7) and (2.8) have reasonable qualitative behavior because (i) as the price uit of a bet on
outcome Ai goes to zero, the intensity of bets goes to infinity
lim
ui→0
λi(pi, ui) =∞, (2.9)
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(ii) as the price uit of a bet on outcome Ai goes to one, the intensity of bets goes to zero
lim
ui→1
λi(pi, ui) = 0, (2.10)
and (iii) all fair bets uit = P
i
t have the same intensity
λi(pi, pi) = λi(qi, qi).
Another rate/intensity function λi we shall consider in this paper is
λi(pi, ui) := κe
–β(ui–pi), κ, β > 0. (2.11)
As we shall see, the form of λi in (2.11) facilitates analytic computation of optimal pricing strategies. Note,
however, that λi in (2.11) does not satisfy (2.9) or (2.10).
Let us denote by YuT the total wealth of the bookmaker just after paying out all winning bets, assuming
he follows pricing policy u. Then we have
YuT = X
u
T –
n∑
i=1
PiTQ
u,i
T = X
u
0 –
n∑
i=1
PiTQ
i
0 +
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(
uit – P
i
T
)
dQu,it , (2.12)
where Qu,it is given by either (2.5) or (2.6).
We will denote by J the bookmaker’s objective function. We shall assume J is of the form
J(t, x, p, q; u) = Et,x,p,qU(YuT),
where U : R→ R is either the identity function or a utility function. Here, we have introduced the notation
Et,x,p,q · = E( · |Xut = x,Pt = p,Qut = q). When we take U to be the identity function, the bookmaker is
risk-neutral. When we take U to be an increasing and concave utility function, the bookmaker is risk-averse.
The bookmaker seeks an optimal (or ε-optimal) control or pricing policy u∗ (or uε) to the problem:
V(t, x, p, q) := sup
u∈A(t,T)
J(t, x, p, q; u), (2.13)
where the admissible set A(t, T) is defined by (2.4). We shall refer to the function V as the bookmaker’s
value function.
3 PDE Characterization of the Value Function
Let us denote by M be the infinitesimal generator of the process P, and by ∂t, ∂x and ∂qi the partial
derivative operators with respect to the corresponding arguments. For any u ∈ A, define operator Lu by
either of the following
Lu :=
n∑
i=1
λi(p, u)(ui∂x – ∂qi) +M, (3.1)
Lu :=
n∑
i=1
λi(p, u)(θ
x
uiθ
qi
1 – 1) +M, (3.2)
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where θqiz is a shift operator of size z in the variable qi, that is, θ
qi
z f(q) := f(q1, . . . , qi+z, . . . , qn). Suppose
the bookmaker were to fix the prices of bets at a constant ut = u. Then Lu as defined in (3.1) is the
generator of (Xu, P,Qu) assuming the dynamics of Qu are described by the continuous arrivals model (2.5),
and Lu as defined in (3.2) is the generator of (Xu, P,Qu) assuming the dynamics of Qu are described by the
Poisson arrivals model (2.6).
As is standard in stochastic control theory, we provide a verification theorem to Problem (2.13) in a
general setting. We refer the reader to (Fleming and Soner, 2006, Section III.8) and (Yong and Zhou, 1999,
Section 4.3) for proofs.
Theorem 3.1. Let v : [0, T] × R+ × A × Rn+ → R be a real-valued function which is at least once
differentiable with respect to all arguments and satisfies
∂xv > 0 and ∂qiv < 0, ∀ i ∈ Nn.
Suppose the function v satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
∂tv + sup
uˆ∈A
Luˆv = 0, v(T, x, p, q) = EU
(
x –
n∑
i=1
qi1Ai
)
, (3.3)
where Luˆ is given by either (3.1) or (3.2). Then v(t, x, p, q) = V(t, x, p, q) is the value function to
Problem (2.13) and the optimal price process u∗ = (u∗s )s∈[t,T] is given by
u∗s = arg max
uˆ∈A
Luˆv(s, X∗s , Ps, Q∗s ). (3.4)
Remark 3.2. The PDE characterization in (3.3) to the value function and the optimal price process given
by (3.4) are obtained without any assumptions on function U, the arrival rate/intensity function λi, or the
conditional probabilities P. With additional assumptions, we may simplify (3.3) and (3.4) to more tractable
forms. For instance, when Qu is defined by the continuous arrivals model (2.5), we can simplify (3.4) and
obtain for all i ∈ Nn thatλi(Ps, u∗s ) + n∑
j=1
uj,∗s · ∂uiλj(Ps, u∗s )
 ∂xV + n∑
j=1
∂uiλj(Ps, u
∗
s ) · ∂qjV = 0. (3.5)
Equation (3.5) reduces the problem of finding the optimal price process u∗ in feedback form to solving a
system of n equations. We shall apply the results of Theorem 3.1 to obtain the value function and/or the
optimal price process in closed forms in the subsequent sections.
4 Analysis of the Semi-static Setting
In this section, we solve the main problem (2.13) in a semi-static setting. The standing assumptions of this
section are as follows.
Assumption 4.1. The arrivals process Qu,i is given by the continuous arrivals model (2.5). The vector
of conditional probabilities is a vector of constants, namely, Pt ≡ p ∈ (0, 1)n for all t ∈ [0, T). The utility
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function U is continuous and strictly increasing. The rate function λi = λi(ui) is a continuous and decreasing
function of ui for all i ∈ Nn.
For notational simplicity, we write the rate function as λi(uit) in the rest of this section because the
conditional probabilities Pt ≡ p are fixed constants. Under Assumption 4.1, we have from (2.12) that the
bookmaker’s terminal wealth YuT is given by
YuT = Xt –
n∑
i=1
Qit · 1Ai +
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
λi(u
i
s) u
i
s ds –
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
λi(u
i
s) ds · 1Ai . (4.1)
As λi is decreasing by Assumption 4.1, its inverse λ–1i exists. Defining the function fi by
fi(x) := x · λ–1i (x), x > 0, i ∈ Nn,
we are able to rewrite YuT in (4.1) as
YuT = Xt –
n∑
i=1
Qit · 1Ai +
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
fi(λi(u
i
s)) ds –
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
λi(u
i
s) ds · 1Ai .
Denote by fˆi the concave envelope of fi and define Yˆ
u
T by
Yˆ
u
T := Xt –
n∑
i=1
Qit · 1Ai +
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
fˆi(λi(u
i
s)) ds –
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
λi(u
i
s) ds · 1Ai . (4.2)
It is obvious that Yˆ
u
T ≥ YuT for any pricing policy u. We are now ready to present the main results of this
section.
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumption 4.1 hold, we have
V(t, x, p, q) = sup
uˆ∈A
Et,x,p,qU
(
x –
n∑
i=1
qi1Ai + (T – t)
n∑
i=1
fˆi(λi(uˆi)) – (T – t)
n∑
i=1
λi(uˆi)1Ai
)
:= Vˆ, (4.3)
= sup
Λ∈Dλ
Et,x,p,qU
(
x –
n∑
i=1
qi1Ai + (T – t)
n∑
i=1
fˆi(Λi) – (T – t)
n∑
i=1
Λi1Ai
)
,
where A = [0, 1]n and Dλ = (Dλ1 ,Dλ2 , · · · ,Dλn) with Dλi being the range of λi for all i ∈ Nn.
Remark 4.3. The results in Theorem 4.2 help us reduce the original problem, which is a dynamic op-
timization problem over an n-dimensional stochastic process, into a static optimization problem over an
n-dimensional constant vector.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 relies on the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.4. Let Assumption 4.1 hold, we have
sup
uˆ∈A
Et,x,p,qU
(
Yˆ
uˆ
T
)
= sup
u∈A(t,T)
Et,x,p,qU
(
Yˆ
u
T
)
,
where Yˆ
u
T is defined by (4.2) and set A(t, T) is defined by (2.4).
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Proof. As the “≤” is obvious, we proceed to show the converse inequality is also true. Let u be any pricing
policy adopted by the bookmaker. As λi is continuous, there exists a constant u∗i such that
λi(u
∗
i ) =
1
T – t
∫ T
t
λi(u
i
s) ds.
By the concavity of fˆi, we obtain
1
T – t
∫ T
t
fˆi(λi(u
i
s)) ds ≤ fˆi
(
1
T – t
∫ T
t
λi(u
i
s) ds
)
= fˆi(λi(u
∗
i )).
As a result, we have
Et,x,p,qU(Yˆ
u
T) ≤ Et,x,p,qU
(
Xt –
n∑
i=1
Qit · 1Ai + (T – t)
n∑
i=1
fˆi(λi(u
∗
i )) – (T – t)
n∑
i=1
λi(u
∗
i )1Ai
)
≤ sup
uˆ∈A
Et,x,p,qU(YuˆT).
Then the result follows from the arbitrariness of u.
Lemma 4.5. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. Then we have
V(t, x, p, q) ≥ sup
uˆ∈A
Et,x,p,qU
(
Yˆ
uˆ
T
)
.
Proof. For any ε > 0, let uε = (uε1, . . . , u
ε
n) be an ε/2-optimizer for Vˆ in (4.3). Let δ > 0 be small enough
so that
Et,x,p,qU
(
Yˆ
uε
T – δ
)
> Et,x,p,qU
(
Yˆ
uε
T
)
– ε/2 > Vˆ – ε.
Next choose vi, wi, ρi ∈ [0, 1] for each i ∈ Nn so that the following conditions are met:
ρi · λi(vi) + (1 – ρi) · λi(wi) = λi(uεi ),
ρi · fi(λi(vi)) + (1 – ρi) · fi(λi(wi)) > fˆi(λi(uεi )) –
δ
n(T – t)
.
We construct a pricing strategy u˜ by
u˜is = vi · 1{t≤s<t+ρi(T–t)} +wi · 1{t+ρi(T–t)≤s≤T}. (4.4)
It is easy to verify that
Yu˜T > Yˆ
uε
T – δ,
which in turn implies
V(t, x, p, q) ≥ Et,x,p,qU
(
Yu˜T
)
≥ Et,x,p,q U
(
Yˆ
uε
T – δ
)
> Vˆ – ε.
Hence, the desired result follows.
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Proof of Theorem 4.2. The result follows from Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 and the fact that fi ≤ fˆi.
Corollary 4.6. If uˆ∗ = (uˆ∗1, uˆ∗2, · · · , uˆ∗n) is an optimizer for Vˆ and
fi(λi(uˆ
∗
i )) = fˆi(λi(uˆ
∗
i )), i ∈ Nn, (4.5)
then uˆ∗ is an optimizer for V. In general, the pricing policy u˜ defined in (4.4) is an ε-optimizer for
V.
Remark 4.7. If fi is concave, (4.5) is satisfied. For example, this is the case if λi is given by (2.7). However,
if λi is given by (2.8), fi in general is not a concave function. In fact, we have
f ′′i (x) < 0 if 0 < x < –
2
log pi
, and f ′′i (x) > 0 if x > –
2
log pi
.
As mentioned in Remark 4.3, Theorem 4.2 allows us to reduce the target optimization problem into a
much simpler static optimization one, but the general characterization (either explicit or numerical solutions)
of the optimal constant vector uˆ∗ to Vˆ is still not available. Below we provide an example where the optimizer
is given by a system of equations.
Corollary 4.8. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. Assume further that (i) the sets (Ai)i∈Nn form a partition
of Ω, (ii) the rate function λi is given by (2.7), and (iii) U is given by
U(y) = –e–γy, γ > 0.
Then the optimizer uˆ∗ of Vˆ, defined in (4.3), solves the following equation
pi ·
(
1
(uˆ∗i )2
– 1
)
· g(t, pi, qi; uˆ∗i ) =
∑
j 6=i
pj · g(t, pj, qj; uˆ∗j ), ∀ i ∈ Nn, (4.6)
where function g is defined by
g(t, pi, qi; ui) := exp
(
γqi + γ(T – t)
pi
1 – pi
(
1
ui
– 1
))
,
for all t ∈ [0, T), pi ∈ (0, 1), qi ∈ R+, and ui ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, if we replace assumption (i) with (i’)
the sets (Ai)i∈Nn are independent, then uˆ
∗ solves the following equation
pi ·
(
1
(uˆ∗i )2
– 1
)
· exp
(
γ(T – t)
pi
1 – pi
(
1
uˆ∗i
– 1
))
= 1 – pi, ∀ i ∈ Nn. (4.7)
Proof. Equations (4.6) and (4.7) are the first-order conditions of the corresponding optimization problems
under the given assumptions. For instance, with assumptions (i’), (ii) and (iii), the optimization problem
becomes
min
uˆ∈(0,1)n
γ(T – t)
n∑
i=1
pi
1 – pi
· uˆi +
n∑
i=1
log
(
1 – pi + pi · exp
(
γ(T – t)
pi
1 – pi
(
1
uˆi
– 1
)))
,
which has the first-order condition (4.7).
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Remark 4.9. From (4.6), we obtain
∂uˆ∗i
∂qi
> 0.
This result is consistent with our intuition that, if the bookmaker has received many (few) bets on the set
of outcomes Ai, the bookmaker should increase (decrease) the price of a bet on Ai to balance the books.
In Figure 1, we plot uˆ∗, given by (4.7), as a function of p, with γ = 2 and T – t = 1. As expected, the
optimizer is an increasing function of the conditional probability. In addition, uˆ∗ is a concave function of p.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
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0.
4
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0
Figure 1: A plot of uˆ∗ as a function of p with γ = 2 and T – t = 1
5 Wealth Maximization
In this section, we consider Problem (2.13) when U(y) = y (i.e., the objective of the bookmaker is to maximize
his expected terminal wealth). Henceforth, we shall refer to this problem as the wealth maximization
problem. We solve the wealth maximization problem using three different methods, and obtain the solutions
Problem (2.13) in Theorem 5.1 and Corollaries 5.3, 5.5 and 5.6.
5.1 Method I
The following Theorem transforms the bookmaker’s dynamic optimization problem into a static optimization
problem.
12
Theorem 5.1. Assume U(y) = y, and the bet arrival process Qu,i is given by either (2.5) or (2.6) for
all i ∈ Nn. Then we have
V(t, x, p, q) = x – p · q + Et,x,p,q
∫ T
t
sup
uˆ∈A
n∑
i=1
λi(Ps, uˆ) · (uˆi – Pis)ds, (5.1)
where p · q =
n∑
i=1
piqi.
Proof. As Qu,i is given by either (2.5) or (2.6), we have
EtdQ
u,i
t = λi(Pt, ut)dt, Et1Ai = P
i
t,
and, as a result,
V(t, x, p, q) = x – p · q + sup
u∈A(t,T)
Et,x,p,q
n∑
i=1
(∫ T
t
uisdQ
u,i
s – Q
u,i
T 1Ai
)
= x – p · q + sup
u∈A(t,T)
Et,x,p,q
n∑
i=1
(∫ T
t
λi(Ps, us) · (uis – Pis)ds
)
= x – p · q + Et,x,p,q
∫ T
t
sup
uˆ∈A
n∑
i=1
λi(Ps, uˆ) · (uˆi – Pis) ds,
where the last equality can be shown by a measurable selection argument (see Wagner (1977)).
Remark 5.2. For any ε > 0, uε = (uεs(p))t≤s<T = (u
ε,1
s (p), . . . , u
ε,n
s (p))t≤s<T measurably selected such
that
n∑
i=1
λi(p, u
ε
s(p)) · (uε,is (p) – pi) ≥ sup
uˆ∈A
n∑
i=1
λi(p, uˆ) (uˆi – pi) – ε, ∀ p ∈ A
is an ε-optimizer of the value function V.
In light of Theorem 5.1, we are able to reduce the complexity of the wealth maximization problem
significantly. As mentioned above, Theorem 5.1 allows us to transform a dynamic optimization problem
(over u ∈ A(t, T)) into a static optimization problem (over uˆ ∈ A), and shows that the value function are
the same for these two problems. Under the general setup, the characterization in (5.1) is not enough for us
to obtain the optimal price process u∗ explicitly. However, when the rate or intensity function λi is given
by (2.7) or (2.8), we are able to find u∗ in closed forms, see the corollary below.
Corollary 5.3. Assume U(y) = y, and the arrival process Qu,i is given by either (2.5) or (2.6) for all
i ∈ Nn.
(i) If the rate or intensity function λi is given by (2.7), then the optimal price process to the wealth
maximization problem is u∗ = (u1,∗t , u
2,∗
t , · · · , un,∗t )t∈[0,T), where ui,∗t is given by
ui,∗t =
√
Pit, ∀ i ∈ Nn. (5.2)
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If we assume further that Pt ≡ p ∈ (0, 1)n for all t ∈ [0, T), then the optimal price process u∗ is
ui,∗t ≡
√
pi, ∀ i ∈ Nn, (5.3)
and the value function V is given by
V(t, x, p, q) = x – p · q + (T – t)
n∑
i=1
pi
1 – pi
(1 –
√
pi)
2 .
(ii) If the rate or intensity function λi is given by (2.8), then the optimal price process to the wealth
maximization problem is u∗ = (u1,∗t , u
2,∗
t , · · · , un,∗t )t∈[0,T), where ui,∗t is the unique solution on
(e–1, 1) to the equation
r(1 + log r) = Pit, ∀ i ∈ Nn. (5.4)
Proof. According to Theorem 5.1, we have
ui,∗t = arg max
uˆi∈[0,1]
1 – uˆi
uˆi
(
uˆi – P
i
T
)
,
when λi is given by (2.7); and
ui,∗t = arg max
uˆi∈[0,1]
log(uˆi)(uˆi – Pit),
when λi is given by (2.8). The rest follows naturally.
Let U : (0, 1)→ (e–1, 1) be the solution function to (5.4), namely, ui,∗t = U(Pit). We easily verify that
0 <
∂U(z)
∂z
=
1
2 + logU(z) ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
and
∂2U(z)
∂z2
=
–1
U
(
2 + logU(z)
)3 < 0.
Thus, the function U is increasing and concave. As such, the optimal price ui,∗ on set of outcomes Ai
increases when the conditional probability Pi increases and the rate of increase is larger when Pi is small.
5.2 Method II (Dynamic Programming Method)
Now, we use the PDE characterization of the bookmaker’s value function (Theorem 3.1) to solve the wealth
maximization problem under the continuous arrivals model (2.5). We begin the analysis by establishing
some analytical properties for the value function V.
Proposition 5.4. Let U(y) = y for all y ∈ R. If the value function V(t, x, p, q) is differentiable with
respect to t, x and q, we have
∂tV(t, x, p, q) < 0, ∂xV(t, x, p, q) = 1, and ∂qiV(t, x, p, q) = –pi, ∀ i ∈ Nn.
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Proof. Recalling the definition of YuT in (2.12), for any price process u ∈ A(t, T), we obtain
Et,x,p,qYuT = Et,x,p,q
[
x +
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
uisdQ
u,i
s –
n∑
i=1
PiTqi –
n∑
i=1
PiT
∫ T
t
dQu,is
]
= x –
n∑
i=1
piqi + Et,x,p,q
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
(uis – P
i
s)λ(P
i
s, u
i
s)ds.
It is clear that, for the optimal price process u∗, we have ui,∗s – Pis > 0 for all s ∈ [t, T] and i ∈ Nn. The
desired results are then obvious.
We now present the explicit solutions to the wealth maximization problem.
Corollary 5.5. Assume U(y) = y and the bets arrive according to the continuous arrivals model (2.5).
(i) If the rate function λi is given by (2.7), then the optimal price process u∗ is given by (5.2). (ii) If
the rate function λi is given by (2.8), then the optimal price process u∗ is the solution to (5.4)
Proof. (i) Under the continuous arrivals model (2.5) with rate function (2.7), we derive from (3.4) that
∂xV –
(
ui,∗s
)–2 · ∂qiV = 0, ∀ i ∈ Nn.
Together with the results from Proposition 5.4, we obtain, for all s ∈ [t, T), that
ui,∗s =
√
–∂qiV(s,X
∗
s , Ps, Q∗s )
∂xV(s,X∗s , Ps, Q∗s )
≡
√
Pis ∈ (0, 1), ∀ i ∈ Nn.
(ii) Under the continuous arrivals model (2.5) with rate function (2.8), we derive from (3.4) that(
1 + log ui,∗t
)
· ∂xV + 1
ui,∗t
· ∂qiV = 0, ∀ i ∈ Nn.
The desired results are then obtained.
5.3 Method III
Lastly, we use the results from Theorem 4.2 to solve the wealth maximization problem.
Corollary 5.6. Let Assumption 4.1 hold and suppose U(y) = y. If an interior optimizer Λ∗ in Theorem
4.2 exists, then we have
fˆ
′
i(Λ
∗
i ) = pi, ∀ i ∈ Nn.
In particular, if λi is given by (2.7), we obtain
Λ∗i =
pi
1 – pi
(
1√pi
– 1
)
and uˆ∗i =
√
pi, ∀ i ∈ Nn
and if λi is given by (2.8), then
p
Λ∗i
i (1 + Λ
∗
i log pi) = pi and uˆ
∗
i (1 + log uˆ
∗
i ) = pi, ∀ i ∈ Nn.
Proof. The first general result is immediate thanks to Theorem 4.2 and the assumption of U(y) = y. As
pointed out in Remark 4.7, if λi is given by (2.7), we have fi = fˆi. If λi is given by (2.8), we calculate
fˆ
′
i(x) = f
′
i(x) > 0 for 0 < x < –
1
log pi .
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5.4 Comparison of the three methods
In terms of the model generality, Theorem 5.1 obtained via Method I is the most general one, since (i) the
conditional probabilities P can be modeled by any stochastic process taking values in (0,1) and (ii) the arrival
process is given by either the continuous arrival model (2.5) or the Poisson arrivals model (2.6). Corollary
5.5 of Method II holds when the arrival process is given by the continuous arrival model (2.5). Corollary 5.6
of Method III is further restricted to P being constants.
In terms of application scope, Method I is the most restricted one, as it only applies to the wealth maxi-
mization problem. Both Methods II and III are developed to solve the main problem for a general function
U, and hence can be applied to solve concave utility maximization problem (see for instance Corollary 4.8).
Both Theorem 5.1 of Method I and Theorem 4.2 of Method III provide an explicit characterization to
the value function, but do not provide an explicit solution to the optimal price process. Method II (dynamic
programming method) provides characterizations to both the value function and the optimal price process.
However, solving the HJB equation (3.3) in Method II is often a challenging task.
From a computational point of view, the static optimization problem in Method I (see (5.1)) or in Method
III (see (4.3)) is easy to solve, while finding the numerical solutions to the HJB equation (3.3) under the
feedback strategy (3.4) may be difficult computationally.
5.5 Probability the Bookmaker Makes a Profit
In this subsection, we analyze the probability that the bookmaker makes profits when he follows the optimal
price process, denoted by P(Y∗T > 0), when the rate or intensity function λi is given by (2.7).
We shall assume the vector of conditional probabilities P is a constant and that the bookmaker has taken
zero bets at time t = 0 and has zero initial wealth
Pt = (p1, p2, . . . , pn), ∀ t < T, X0 = 0, Qi0 = 0, ∀ i ∈ Nn.
Under these conditions we study the bookmaker’s terminal wealth Y∗T under the optimal policy u
∗ given
by (5.3). For simplicity, we consider betting on the result of coin toss. The two possible outcomes are
A1 = {Heads} and A2 = {Tails}. Suppose P1t ≡ pˆ ∈ (0, 1) for all t ∈ [0, T). We carry out the analysis based
on the two models of the arrival process Qu
∗,i – the continuous arrivals model (2.5) and the Poisson arrivals
model (2.6).
Case 1: Continuous arrivals model (2.5) with λi given by (2.7). In this case, the bookmaker’s terminal
wealth Y∗T is given by
Y∗T(Heads) = ψ1(pˆ) · T and Y∗T(Tails) = ψ1(1 – pˆ) · T,
where function ψ1 is defined by
ψ1(pˆ) :=
pˆ
1 – pˆ
(
2 –
√
pˆ –
1√
pˆ
)
+
1 – pˆ
pˆ
(1 –
√
1 – pˆ), pˆ ∈ (0, 1).
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As seen in Figure 2, ψ1 is a decreasing function over (0, 1) with
lim
pˆ→0
ψ1(pˆ) =
1
2
and lim
pˆ→1
ψ1(pˆ) = 0.
Hence, regardless of the probability that the coin toss results in a heads, the bookmaker is guaranteed
to make a profit by following the optimal price policy given by (5.3). If pˆ = 0.5 (the coin is fair), the
bookmaker’s profit is a constant given by
Y∗T = ψ1(0.5) · T ≈ 0.171573 · T.
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Figure 2: Graph of ψ1 over (0, 1)
Case 2. Poisson arrivals model (2.6) with λi given by (2.7). In this case, the bookmaker’s terminal wealth
Y∗T is given by
Y∗T(Heads) = (
√
pˆ – 1) ·Qu∗,1T +
√
1 – pˆ ·Qu∗,2T ,
Y∗T(Tails) =
√
pˆ ·Qu∗,1T + (
√
1 – pˆ – 1) ·Qu∗,2T ,
where the total number of bets placed on Heads and Tails Qu
∗,i
T (i = 1, 2) are independent Poisson random
variables with expectations given by
λ∗i · T =
√pi(1 – √pi)
1 – pi
· T, where p1 = pˆ, p2 = 1 – pˆ.
Let us compute P(Y∗T > 0), the probability that the bookmaker obtains a profit. We have
P(Y∗T > 0) = P(Heads) · P
(
Qu
∗,1
T <
√
1 – pˆ
1 –
√
pˆ
·Qu∗,2T
)
+ P(Tails) · P
(
Qu
∗,2
T <
√
pˆ
1 –
√
1 – pˆ
·Qu∗,1T
)
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= pˆ
∞∑
j=1
e–λ
∗
2T
(λ∗2T)j
j!
M1(j)∑
i=0
e–λ
∗
1T
(λ∗1T)i
i!
+ (1 – pˆ)
∞∑
i=1
e–λ
∗
1T
(λ∗1T)i
i!
M2(i)∑
j=0
e–λ
∗
2T
(λ∗2T)j
j!
, (5.5)
where M1(k) is the largest integer less than
√
1–pˆ
1–
√
pˆ
· k and M2(k) is the largest integer less than
√
pˆ
1–
√
1–pˆ
· k
for all k = 0, 1, · · · . The expression (5.5) allows us to compute P(Y∗T > 0) numerically in an efficient way.
For instance, given pˆ = 0.5, we compute
P(Y∗T > 0) =

33.6747% T = 1,
54.4348% T = 2,
76.8231% T = 5,
86.4919% T = 10.
6 Exponential Utility Maximization
In this section, we study Problem (2.13) when U(y) = –e–γy, with γ > 0, henceforth called the exponential
utility maximization problem. We solve this problem assuming Qu is described by the Poisson arrivals
model (2.6).1 We summarize the key results in Theorem 6.2. Let us begin by stating some assumptions,
which are assumed to hold throughout the analysis that follows.
Assumption 6.1. The utility function U is given by U(y) = –e–γy, where γ > 0. The vector of conditional
probabilities is a vector of constants, namely, Pt ≡ p ∈ (0, 1)n for all t ∈ [0, T). The bet arrivals process Qu,i is
given by the Poisson arrivals model (2.6). The rate function λi is given by (2.11), i.e., λi(pi, ui) = κe–β(ui–pi),
where κ, β > 0.
As in the previous section, because the conditional probability of set Ai is assumed to be a fixed constant
pi, in order to simplify the notation, we write the intensity function as λi(ui) for all i ∈ Nn. Under
Assumption 6.1, with Xt = x, Pt = p and Qt = q, the bookmaker’s terminal wealth YuT is given by
YuT =
(
x +
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
uitdN
u,i
t –
n∑
i=1
(
qi +
∫ T
t
dNu,it
)
1Ai
)
.
The standard method of solving a stochastic control problem is to develop a verification theorem first,
solve the associated HJB PDE with appropriate boundary conditions, and verify all the conditions in the
verification theorem are met. We have followed exactly this standard method previously; see Theorem 3.1
and Corollary 5.5. It is clear that the general verification theorem obtained in Theorem 3.1 also applies to
the problem we are considering in this section, with operator Lu given by (3.2) and M = 0. Please refer to
(Øksendal and Sulem, 2005, Chapter 3) for standard stochastic control theory with jumps.
The HJB associated with the exponential utility maximization problem is
∂tV(t, x, p, q) +
n∑
i=1
sup
ui
(λi(ui)[V(t, x + ui, p, q + ei) – V(t, x, p, q)]) = 0, (6.1)
1Notice Corollary 4.8 solves the exponential utility maximization problem under the continuous arrivals model (2.5), among
other model assumptions.
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and the boundary conditions are
V(T, x, p, q) = –e–γx · a(q), (6.2)
where ei ∈ Nn is the vector whose i-th component is 1 and other components are 0, and
a(q) := E exp
(
γ
n∑
i=1
qi1Ai
)
.
To better present the solutions in Theorem 6.2, we define constants c, bi and hi by
c :=
β
γ
, bi := κe
βpi · γ
β+ γ
·
(
β
β+ γ
) β
γ
, and hi := cbi, i ∈ Nn, (6.3)
and functions d(q) and αk(q), k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , by
d(q) := [a(q)]–c,
α0(q) := d(q),
αk(q) :=
1
k!
∑
j∈Nn:|j|=k
( n∏
i=1
hjii
)
· d(q + j),
where j = (j1, . . . , jn) ∈ Nn and |j| := j1 + . . .+ jn. For instance, when k = 1, we have
α1(q) :=
n∑
i=1
hi · d(q + ei).
Theorem 6.2. Let Assumption 6.1 hold. The value function V of Problem (2.13) is given by
V(t, x, p, q) = –e–γx [G(t, q)]–1/c , (6.4)
where function G is defined by
G(T, q) = d(q), G(t, q) =
∞∑
k=0
αk(q) · (T – t)k, t ∈ [0, T). (6.5)
The optimal price process u∗ = (u∗s )s∈[t,T] to Problem (2.13) is given by
ui,∗s = –
1
γ
log
[
β · H(s,Q∗s )
(β+ γ) · H(s,Q∗s + ei)
]
, i ∈ Nn, (6.6)
where H(t, q) := [G(t, q)]–1/c.
Proof. As the utility function is of exponential form, we make the following Ansatz
V(t, x, p, q) = –e–γx · H(t, q).
Inserting the Ansatz into the HJB equation (6.1) and the boundary condition (6.2), we obtain
∂tH(t, q) +
n∑
i=1
inf
ui
(λi(ui)[e
–γuiH(t, q + ei) – H(t, q)]) = 0, and H(T, q) = a(q). (6.7)
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Solving the infimum problems in (6.7) gives
u∗i = –
1
γ
log
[
β · H(t, q)
(β+ γ) · H(t, q + ei)
]
> 0, (6.8)
which proves the optimal price process in (6.6) once H is found. Next, substituting u∗i in (6.8) back into
(6.7), we obtain
∂tH(t, q) –
n∑
i=1
bi ·
[H(t, q)]c+1
[H(t, q + ei)]c
= 0, (6.9)
where constants bi and c are defined by (6.3). Now let
G(t, q) := [H(t, q)]–c.
We establish the equation for G as follows
∂tG(t, q) +
n∑
i=1
hi ·G(t, q + ei) = 0, and G(T, q) = d(q). (6.10)
where hi = cbi as in (6.3). The results from Lemma 6.3 verify that G given by (6.5) solves (6.10), and
therefore the value function to Problem (2.13) is given by (6.4).
Lemma 6.3. We have
1. The series x 7→∑∞k=0 αk(q)xk is convergent with radius +∞, and hence, G(t, q) given by (6.5) is
well defined and is in fact analytic.
2. G(t, q) given by (6.5) is a solution to (6.10).
Proof. Denote by b := max{b1, . . . , bn}. For k large enough, we have
|αk(q)| ≤
1
k!
∑
j∈Nn:|j|=k
bk =
1
k!
(
k + n – 1
n – 1
)
bk ∼ 1
k!
kn–1
(n – 1)!
bk <
kn
k!
bk ∼ b
k–n
(k – n)!
bn,
which proves the first result. To show the second result, we obtain
∂tG(t, q) = –
∞∑
k=1
k · αk(q) (T – t)k–1 = –
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1) αk+1(q) · (T – t)k,
n∑
i=1
hiG(t, q + ei) =
∞∑
k=0
( n∑
i=1
hi · αk(q + ei)
)
(T – t)k.
Since we have
n∑
i=1
hi · αk(q + ei) =
n∑
i=1
hi
1
k!
∑
j∈Nn:|j|=k
(
hj11 . . .h
jn
n
)
· d(q + ei + j)
=
1
k!
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Nn:|j|=k
hi ·
(
hj11 . . .h
jn
n
)
· d(q + ei + j)
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=
1
k!
∑
j′∈Nn:|j′|=k+1
(
hj
′
1
1 . . .h
j′n
n
)
· d(q + j′)
= (k + 1)αk+1(q),
the second result follows.
In the analysis above, we do not impose any upper bound on the number of bets the bookmaker takes.
However, if the bookmaker sets an upper for each betting event, we need to modify the results in Theorem
6.2 as described in the corollary below.
Corollary 6.4. Let Assumption 6.1 hold. Assume the total number of bets placed on set of outcomes
Ai is at most mi, where i ∈ Nn. The value function to Problem (2.13) is given by
V(t, x, p, q) = –e–γx
[
Gˇ(t, q)
]–1/c
,
where Gˇ is defined by
Gˇ(T, q) = d(q), Gˇ(t, q) =
|m|–|q|∑
k=0
αˇk(q) · (T – t)k, t ∈ [0, T),
with functions αˇk(q) given by
αˇ0(q) := d(q), αˇk(q) :=
1
k!
∑
j∈I(k,q)
( n∏
i=1
hjii
)
· d(q + j),
for all k = 1, 2, · · · ,∑ni=1mi and
I(k, q) := {j ∈ Nn : |j| = k, q + j ≤ m := (m1,m2, · · · ,mn)}.
The optimal price process u∗ = (u∗s )s∈[t,T] to Problem (2.13) is given by
ui,∗s = –
1
γ
log
[
β · Hˇ(s, Q∗s )
(β+ γ) · Hˇ(s, Q∗s + ei)
]
,
for all i ∈ I(q), where Hˇ(t, q) := [Gˇ(t, q)]–1/c and
I(q) := {i : qi < mi} ⊂ Nn = {1, . . . , n}. (6.11)
Proof. With the extra upper bound assumption, the bets on Ai will arrive according to a Poisson process
at intensity λi(ui) if the total number is less than mi; and 0 if otherwise. Notice that all the equations (6.1),
(6.7), (6.9), and (6.10) still hold, except that the summation over index i in these equations will be restricted
to the set I(q), defined by (6.11). All the results follow naturally by Theorem 6.2.
21
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a general framework for continuous-time betting markets. A bookmaker takes
bets on random (sporting) events and pays off the winning bets at the terminal time T. The conditional
probability of a set of outcomes is exogenous and may be stochastic, and the bets placed on a set of
outcomes may arrive either at a continuous rate or as a state-dependent Poisson process. The bookmaker
controls (updates) the prices of bets dynamically. In turn, the prices set by the bookmaker affect the
rates or intensities of bet arrivals. The bookmaker seeks to set prices in order to maximize his expected
terminal wealth or expected utility of terminal wealth. We are able to obtain either explicit solutions or
characterizations of such optimal bookmaking problems in a number of distinct settings.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Agostino Capponi and Xuedong He for valuable comments and suggestions.
Bin Zou acknowledges a start-up grant from the University of Connecticut.
References
Adrian, T., Capponi, A., Vogt, E., and Zhang, H. (2019). Intraday market making with overnight inventory
costs. http: // dx. doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn. 2844881 .
Avellaneda, M. and Stoikov, S. (2008). High-frequency trading in a limit order book. Quantitative Finance,
8(3):217–224.
Bayraktar, E. and Ludkovski, M. (2014). Liquidation in limit order books with controlled intensity. Math-
ematical Finance, 24(4):627–650.
Cartea, Á. and Jaimungal, S. (2015). Optimal execution with limit and market orders. Quantitative
Finance, 15(8):1279–1291.
Divos, P., Rollin, S. D. B., Bihari, Z., and Aste, T. (2018). Risk-neutral pricing and hedging of in-play
football bets. Applied Mathematical Finance, 25(4):315–335.
Fleming, W. H. and Soner, H. M. (2006). Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions, volume 25.
Springer Science & Business Media.
Gatheral, J. and Schied, A. (2013). Dynamical models of market impact and algorithms for order execution.
HANDBOOK ON SYSTEMIC RISK, Jean-Pierre Fouque, Joseph A. Langsam, eds, pages 579–599.
Guéant, O. (2017). Optimal market making. Applied Mathematical Finance, 24(2):112–154.
Guéant, O., Lehalle, C.-A., and Fernandez-Tapia, J. (2012). Optimal portfolio liquidation with limit orders.
SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics, 3(1):740–764.
22
Guilbaud, F. and Pham, H. (2013). Optimal high-frequency trading with limit and market orders. Quanti-
tative Finance, 13(1):79–94.
Ho, T. and Stoll, H. R. (1981). Optimal dealer pricing under transactions and return uncertainty. Journal
of Financial Economics, 9(1):47–73.
Hodges, S., Lin, H., and Liu, L. (2013). Fixed odds bookmaking with stochastic betting demands. European
Financial Management, 19(2):399–417.
Kratz, P. and Schöneborn, T. (2015). Portfolio liquidation in dark pools in continuous time. Mathematical
Finance, 25(3):496–544.
Øksendal, B. K. and Sulem, A. (2005). Applied stochastic control of jump diffusions, volume 498. Springer.
Street and Smith (2018). A look inside the numbers of sports betting in the u.s. and overseas. Street and
Smith’s Sports Business Journal.
Wagner, D. H. (1977). Survey of measurable selection theorems. SIAM Journal on Control and Opti-
mization, 15(5):859–903.
Yong, J. and Zhou, X. Y. (1999). Stochastic controls: Hamiltonian systems and HJB equations, vol-
ume 43. Springer Science & Business Media.
Zion (2018). Sports betting market by platform, by type, and by sports type: Global industry perspective,
comprehensive analysis, and forecast, 2017–2024. Technical report, Zion Market Research.
23
